Global Debates

  Kirsty Hughes, 26th June 2006

Two months after Nepal’s extraordinary people’s movement that brought up to 5 million people onto the streets across this small Himalayan country, prospects for a permanent peace are getting tantalisingly close. But the closer Nepal’s political leaders and the Maoists get to a deal, the tougher are the questions.

The king though defeated still sits in his ugly 1970s palace protected by armed troops, anarchic Kathmandu traffic winding round its walls. Many Nepalis will only feel sure of their democratic revolution once he is gone. Key civil society leader Devendra Panday Raj considers: “the king’s status now is that of an uninvited guest”. While for leading human rights activist, Krishna Pahadi “the monarchy is like a tapeworm, if you stop taking the medicine, the tapeworm looks for any opportunity to grow again”.

But probably the thorniest issue for now is not the king, who’s been stripped of all powers, but how to handle the arms and soldiers both of the Maoists and of the Nepalese Army, as the country moves towards elections.

Last Friday,  top Maoist leader Prachanda, appearing in public in Kathmandu for the first time in 25 years, met with Nepalese Prime Minister G P Koirala and other leaders of the 7 main political parties. With unexpected speed, they reached a dramatic outline agreement on moving to form an interim government to include the Maoists, write an interim constitution, and dissolve the current parliament. It was also agreed to ask for UN support in arms monitoring in the run-up to elections to the constitutional assembly that will chart Nepal’s democratic future, including whether to become a republic.

Forming an interim government  will be a vital step in binding the Maoists back into a peaceful, democratic political system.  A ceasefire is already in place. But the critical question is the arms issue.  Key government negotiator, home minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula emphasised this week that forming an interim government presumes a deal on management of the armies and weapons of both sides.

While the Maoists seem ready to have both their troops and the Nepali army confined to designated areas, and UN monitoring of arms, they are not ready to fully demobilise until elections to the constituent assembly. Eventually there may even be merging of some Maoist troops into the Nepali army, which will anyway need down-sizing from its current 100,000 soldiers. 

But if the Maoists’ arms are not put irrevocably beyond use now, the Maoists, as part of an interim government, would in effect have some control both over the Nepali Army and over their Maoist troops. This worries some – and has also led to vocal interventions from US diplomats. But it is the political dynamics of the people’s movement that explains how such an unusual situation may be the outcome. 

The army backed the detested king Gyanendra when he took over absolute power on February 1st 2005.  And a  crucial catalyst in bringing people to the streets to fight this power grab was the 12 point deal agreed between political parties and Maoists last November (put together with encouragement from India) which pointed the way to peace via an interim government and a constitutional assembly.  Large numbers of Maoist supporters joined the April demonstrations without arms, facing the often violent response of the security forces which left 21 civilians dead.  

And so the Maoists, currently in control of up to 80% of rural Nepal, do not accept that their arms should be put irrevocably beyond use before the key goal of elections is achieved.  This argument has most force while the Nepali Army remains unreformed. Though Koirala’s new transitional government has taken control of the army away from the king, it has yet to instigate any serious reforms of the army.

Shyam Shrestha, editor of the Mulyankan magazine, in his office near a traffic-choked Kathmandu junction, smiles but insists: “They should do something soon on the army or they will bear the anger and wrath of the people”.  For
Krishna Pahadi: “The army was defeated. They were loyal to the king in the past and the country paid a huge price”. 

Both Maoists and the Nepali Army committed major human rights abuses during the years of the conflict. A devastating report by the UN human rights team in late May details hundreds of cases of torture and disappearances in the Maharajgunj army barracks in Kathmandu itself during 2003.  

And though the Rayamajhi Commission, set up in May to investigate security forces abuses since the king’s 2005 coup, called  immediately for the heads of all four security forces to be suspended, only 3 heads rolled – of police, armed police and intelligence – while the army chief remains.  A leading Nepali human rights organisation, Huron, fed up with lack of action, filed a legal petition on 21st June for the suspension of army chief of staff, Pyar Jung Thapa.

All this impacts on whether the two sides can do a deal on arms management. Ian Martin, head of the UN’s human rights office in Nepal, may play a key advisory role behind the scenes. In his office near Kathmandu’s Swayambhunath Buddhist temple, and over-looking a large army barracks, he agrees that arms management in the run-up to an interim government is “a central negotiating issue”. He adds: “We have a lot of experience of periods of supervision of forces prior to disarmament or absorption into government forces but the situation is fairly unique in terms of issues of phasing and linkage to the political process”. 

Squaring the ‘fairly unique’ circle may be hard. Some Nepali politicians and a few foreign diplomats want the Maoists to put arms beyond use now, not simply under international supervision. Despite their damaged diplomatic reputation here (after backing the king from 2002 to 2005, and their public support of the king’s first much derided offer on 21st April), the US and the UK maintain a high profile.  

Robert Hugins, public affairs head at the US embassy insists: “For us, it’s clear. They must put down their weapons to participate in an interim government and any constituent assembly elections” – a line echoed by British ambassador Keith Bloomfield.  But as one foreign diplomat comments: “This is the business of the Nepalis not the
US or Brits”. Another adds: “Everyone recognises the US excessive fetishisation of the Maoists”.  

The US has expressed strong public support for the army since April. Some other western diplomats also urge soft treatment for the army, despite its support for the king’s 2005 coup. “They may need the army again against the Maoists” says one. US assistant secretary of state Richard Boucher bristled visibly when asked at a Kathmandu press conference in early May why he had visited the army chief of staff.   

More moderate comments come from one very senior retired Nepali army officer who emphasises that both sides must be treated “with dignity”. He goes on: ” Putting the Nepali army in barracks does not mean ‘confining’ – in peace time armies are in barracks. I believe the Maoist soldiers did fight well, we fought to a stalemate. We have got to be graceful”.

Failure to do a deal and a return to conflict is the worst-case scenario. Young civil society leader, Hari Roka thinks that “if the Maoists raise arms again, the country will collapse and young people will go. If there is no peace, then it will be anarchy”.

But democratic reforms and peace talks with the Maoists have proceeded faster and more successfully than many dared hope two months ago. If this dynamic can be maintained, then it is to be hoped that the two sides will find a deal on arms, move to an interim government and within a year hold elections that will herald the real start of a new Nepal.